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Trade unionism is a legislative system of organizing workers and raising voices for economic 
and social goods. As the process of global integration deepens the labour market become 
more flexible and fragmented, rendering collective organization more and more difficult. In 
this backdrop, the paper attempted to analyse the impact of union membership on wages in 
the organised manufacturing industries in India. The study uses a recent survey data on 
labour market in the organised manufacturing industries. The estimated wage premiums for 
union membership for permanent and contract workers are 56.7 per cent and 10.3 per cent 
respectively. Decomposing this wage gap indicates that union membership contributes 
majority of the wage differentials, indicating that unions able to reserve higher premium for 
their members. In general, it refutes the problem of free riding the benefits in the organized 
manufacturing industries in India. 
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1. Introduction 
In a democratic country trade unions can essentially be looked upon as interest 
groups of industrial workers. Union membership has traditionally been the principle 
agent of voice representation, which empower worker in the form of better wages 
and benefits, better working conditions as well as job security (Booth, 1995). Trade 
unionism is a legislative system of organizing workers and rising voice for economic 
and social benefits. In a democratic country like India the strength and organization 
of unions are tied up with political parties to function as independent entities. In 
United States trade union is an economic association of workers thriving on free 
collective bargaining, giving freedom to workers to choose unions. In Britain unions 
maintain their separate identities as socio-economic interest groups and enjoy full 
freedom to bargain with employers. In other democracies like France and Italy trade 
unions are closely associated with political parties. In the ex-colonial democracies 
the trade union movement has developed as an aspect of nationalist movement and 
eventually been tied with political parties.  
The presence of unions is associated collective bargaining such as higher wage rates, 
benefits in order to improve the condition of the workers. The differences in wages 
between union and non-union workers considered an important indicator of union 
control. There are large fields of empirical study on the wage differential between 
them. On average, almost all studies uniformly conclude that there is a positive 
union-nonunion wage gap. However, when disaggregated calculations are done, 
union memberships are not always associated with positive wage gaps (Booth, 
1994). In the USA and Britain, trade unions significantly reduce wage dispersion 
among the workers. Freeman (1982) showed that in the US unions reduce intra-
industry wage dispersion and wage dispersion across certain labour markets. Trade 
unions in Britain also reduce wage dispersion within the union sector (Gosling and 
Machin, 1993).  
In India, under the trade Union Act 1926, seven workers can form a union and take 
part in negotiation through collective bargaining. In 1947 legislation for resolving 
conflicts at the workplace were introduced in the form of Industrial Dispute Act. 
Under this law both employers and employees will have to inform the labour 
commissioner before declaring lockout or strikes. In principal, to retrench workers, 
employers have to seek permission from the government if the factory employs 
more than 100 workers. It is a debate how much obstacle the labour laws are 
creating in flexibility in labour use. Companies are using contract workers in place 
of permanent workers in core activities. The labour unrest at Hero Honda plant at 
Gurgaon indicated the dependence of contract workers by Indian manufacturing 
industries. There are no evidence exists that firms employing more than hundred 
workers are facing hurdles in laying off workers when compared to firms that 
employ less than hundred workers. 
Globalisation
1 has weakens the bargaining position of trade unions as it increases the 
substitutability of employees (Rodrik, 1997). In India, trade unions have been 
loosing its strength ever since the reform process begun. The opening up of the 
economy is accompanied by vigorous campaign for the right to hire and fire workers 
freely. As the process of globalization and liberalization deepens, the employers are 
demanding greater flexibility in labour use so that they can freely deploy or retrench 
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workers if the business environment demands.
2 As a result, there has been a 
structural shift in employment from permanent to temporary, contract or casual 
employment. All these development has resulted in weakening bargaining power of 
labour unions. The bargaining power of trade unions has further been weakened by 
new managerial strategies like outsourcing and parallel production (Sharma, 2006). 
The drive for labour flexibility and just-in-time production has led to the changes in 
employment contract, whereby full time work is declining and part time, casual and 
contractual work is on the rise (O’Conuor et al, 1999). Official figures indicate that 
organized manufacturing industries shed about 18 per cent job between 1997 and 
2004. At the same time, contractualisation is rising proportionate to the fall in 
permanent jobs. Contract employees are typically without the legislative protection 
compared to their counterpart. Since the contract workers have no formal 
employment status and can be retrenched anytime, it is difficult to organize them. 
Moreover, contract worker cannot join the unions of the permanent workers. 
However, contract worker prefer to stay away from any union activities because of 
the fear of job and income security. Trade unions become more defensive in the age 
of reform due to structural transformation of the economy, which have forced them 
to reorient their role to ensure the survival of the industry. As the future of trade 
unions depends on the size of workforce, the growing number of contract workers 
might loose momentum of the trade union movement. 
In Indian less than two percent workers in both formal and informal sector are 
covered by union membership. Union’s share is dominant in public sector 
enterprises confined among the workers in the organised industries. With the spread 
of industrialization and economic development, trade union movement has acquired 
varied colour. One striking feature is the rapid growth in unionism among white-
collar workers (Sahoo, 1999). In India unions represents almost all industries and 
most of them are affiliated to political parties. The impact of union is depends on 
many factors such as qualitative and qualitative strength and its leadership. The 
presence of unions is higher in the states ruling by leftist parties such as West 
Bengal and Kerala. On the other hand, in the North Indian states have low share of 
unionized firms. Bigger firms are more likely to be unionized than smaller firms 
(Deshpande et al, 2004). 
In a firm there should be equal wage between union members and non-members. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that union members are getting wage 
advantage than non-union workers. In the United States private sector union 
members gain substantially in terms of wage and benefits compared to their 
counterpart (Budd and Na, 2000; Schumacher, 1999). Using British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) Hildreth (1999) showed that there exists positive wage 
difference in United Kingdom. The wage difference between union and non-member 
workers can be distinguished as structural effects and the difference that cannot be 
traced from the difference in characteristics, which is referred as union effect. The 
structural effect includes the difference in productivity augmenting characteristics 
like education, experience, skills and other job related characteristics. 
Dunlop (1944) was the first to declare a trade union as an economic theory which 
requires that the organization be assumed to maximize (or minimize) something. 
According to him, the aim of trade union is to maximize the total amount of wages 
                                                 
2 Bhandari and Heshmati (2005) highlighted the fact that despite the rigidity in labour laws firms in 
the organized manufacturing industries adjust its labour to the optimal level.     4
and benefits by its members. During the seventies and eighties, the development of 
human capital theory and access to better data source made possible the rise in new 
generation studies of wage differentials
3. Unions negotiate with their employer for 
higher wages, health benefits, retirement benefits, hours of work and working 
environment. The effect of unions on the distribution of earning depends on the size 
of the union wage premium, the position of the organised workers in the non-union 
earning distribution and the effect of unions on inequality within the organized 
sector (Freeman and Card, 1993). One fifth of the recent rise in male wage 
inequality in the United States is due to the decline in unionization [Card (1991) and 
Freeman (1991)]. In India, the presence of union in manufacturing industries 
explains only a little portion of the wage gap between permanent and contractual 
workers (Bhandari and Heshmati, 2008). 
The wage difference between union and non-union workers can be distinguished as 
structural effects and the difference that cannot be traced from the difference in their 
characteristics.  The second effect is referred as union effect. The structural effect 
includes the difference in education, experience, skills and other job related 
characteristics. In a firm no distinctions are made based on the status of union 
membership, that is union members receive same wages as non-union members. 
Unions do not try to negotiate lower wages for non-members. If the non-members 
were paid less, firms would substitute union workers to cheaper non-union workers, 
which in turn may drive unions out of existence. However, empirical evidence on 
union ‘wage effect’ suggests that union members are getting wage advantage than 
non-union workers. There are several reasons for different returns in the union 
covered and non-covered workers. Union members my try to discriminate against 
non-union workers in order to discourage free riding (Blackmore et al, 1986). 
Union set wages for all workers irrespective their membership. It is very difficult for 
unions to sell group incentive schemes to its rank and file its beneficiaries to only a 
small subset of its constituencies. Hence, there exists a free riding problem 
associated with union membership. The free riding assumes that the outcome of any 
union bargaining is available to all workers whether they are members. In a 
workplace, free riding problem is relevant where there is no coercion of joining 
union. The reason for joining union in the absence of coercion is the anticipation of 
excludable goods and services offered by unions (Olson, 1965). The excludable 
goods might include pension advice, legal advice etc (Booth & Bryan, 2004). 
However, empirically it is difficult to estimate the effects of excludable goods on the 
decision to join union by the workers. 
The present study is the first of its kind to estimate the wage difference between 
union and non-union member in manufacturing industries in India and the sources of 
this difference, if it exists. To what extent the salary of the industrial workers 
covered by collective bargaining by unions exceeds the salaries of workers not 
covered by union bargaining. The study addresses the issue employment status, 
where both permanent and contractual workers are considered. The paper is 
organized as follows. The characteristics of data set used in this study are discussed 
in Section 2. The methodology used to in the study is discussed in Section 3. The 
next section reports the results highlighting the difference in the mean of log wages 
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for union and non-union workers. The final section concludes the paper with policy 
implications. 
2. Data and Sample Characteristics 
The information available with secondary sources does not permit for a 
comprehensive analysis of trade union and its wage impact in the organized 
manufacturing industries in India
4. The data for this study were collected from a 
field study of individual factory workers from different industries and from 
industrially developed locations of the country
5. The areas from where the data were 
collected are West Bengal, Uttar Predesh, Haryana and Delhi. The surveys were 
conducted during 2004-05. The survey contains information on workers personal as 
well as job related characteristics. The sample includes 551 workers from different 
factories under organized manufacturing industries. The factory belongs to 16 
industries under 2-digit industry groups of National Industrial Classification 1998. 
The information was collected on the basis of a structured questionnaire. The 
samples were randomly chosen within the framework that the number of workers 
restricted to at most five in a particular firm so as to cover a wider industry groups. 
For the sake of comparability, major attention was given in selecting the type of 
workers in a firm so that the sample become represents both permanent and 
contractual groups. As far as union penetration among the workers is concerned 
West Bengal has traditionally been the stronghold of trade unions compared to other 
parts of the country. In compliance with general perception, 65 per cent of the 
workers are union members, while 35 per cent are from other states. Traditionally, 
union penetrations are dominant in West Bengal, especially among the permanent 
workers, while in other regions contractual workers are more unionized in the 
sample.  
The descriptive statistics of the variables used of the study are presented in Table 2. 
The union density is 48 per cent in the total sample. The data are disaggregated into 
permanent and contractual sub-samples. This represents 49.2 per cent permanent and 
50.8 per cent contractual workers. As far as worker’s category and unionization are 
concerned about 50.6 per cent permanent workers and 39.6 per cent contract 
workers respectively. The unionized workers earn higher income compared to non-
unionized workers. The average difference in wage is highest is narrow among 
contractual segments. For permanent category, unionized workers earn average per 
hour wage of Rs. 20.8 while non-union worker earn Rs. 16.6. On the other hand, 
within the contractual group the average per hour wage of unionized and non-
unionized workers are Rs. 10.5 and Rs. 9.9 respectively. Thus, wage difference is 
higher among the permanent members. For education, the highest number of worker 
belongs to basic education category, followed by secondary and higher secondary 
education for both unionized and non-unionized category. The average job tenure, 
which is a proxy of job experience of the workers are 10.2 years and 6.2 year for 
union member and non-members respectively. In the unionized segment, highest 
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migrant workers are found among contractual workers (65.8 per cent), while 70.1 
per cent migrant workers have general union membership. As far as general skill are 
concerned majority of the workers are skilled. However, a little portion of workers 
has special training across various categories of workers. Union penetration is 
significantly lower in Special Economic Zone (SEZ) areas.  
3. Methodology 
The strategy to estimate the impact of union on wage premium follows the standard 
practice of human capital model. The estimation process is divided into two stages. 
In the first stage, the wages of individual workers are regressed on a vector of 
workers characteristics (personal and job related). This estimation is made for union 






i X W ε β + =    
where W = natural logarithm of hourly wage rate; X = a vector of worker’s personal 
as well as job related characteristics (see Appendix for the list of variables), β  = 
coefficient of the individual variables and ε  = random error term which are 
assumed to satisfy the usual properties. The subscript j denotes workers type, j = 
(Permanent and Contract workers). The earning equation is estimated separately for 
both union and non-union workers to investigate the difference in the return of the 
individual and job related characteristics considered in this study.  












n X W β ˆ =  
where the hats denotes estimated parameters and the bars over variables indicate 
sample mean. W is the mean wage, X is a vector of the mean values of the wage 
determining characteristics. β is a vector of estimated coefficients or return to the 












u X X W W β β ˆ ˆ − = −  
In the second step, following Oaxaca (1973) methodology the above equation has 
expanded. The difference in wages is to be adjusted to identify the difference in the 
factors affecting wages. Since there are two different wage structures there is no 
theoretical and empirical guidance for us to know definite wage structure prevailing 
in the market. First, we assume that we assume the real wage structure affecting the 
labor market is union wage structure and adjust the gross earnings differential in 
terms of the coefficient of the union wage equation, and obtain an estimate of union 
and non-union earnings differential. Second, we assume the real wage structure 
prevailing in the labor market is non-union wage structure
6.  
() ( ) n u n u n u n u X X X W W W β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ − + − = − = ∆  
( ) ( ) n u u n n u X X X β β β ˆ ˆ ˆ − + − =  
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(2). Secondly,  u n X β  is added and follows the same procedure.    7
Thus, the average wage differential between union and non-union workers is 
decomposed into two components. The first term on the right hand side is supposed 
to correspond to the difference in productivity or the difference in endowment 
evaluated according to the non-union returns( ) n β , the second term is the differences 
in the pay structure between union and non-union workers evaluated by the mean 
value of the union characteristics, which is termed as union wage premium.  
4. Empirical Results 
The analysis is focused on the structural differences in wages between union and 
non-union segment of workers in the manufacturing industries. The empirical result 
highlights the importance of human capital model in determining earning, following 
Mincer’s earning equation. The wage equation is estimated for permanent and 
contractual workers in each segment using level of education, occupational 
experience, skill, migration and industrial location (see Table 3). As discussed in the 
previous section the semilog earning function has been estimated to investigate the 
impacts on earning because of the change in explanatory variables.  
Table 3 contains results of the estimated coefficients from the union and non-union 
wage equations. For permanent workers, the estimates of the return to education are 
higher in the union segment than in the non-union segment
7. Most of the estimated 
coefficients in the contractual workers are statistically insignificant across two 
equations. Each successive education level is associated with subsequent higher 
earnings. However, the return to education is higher for union segment. The return 
to job tenure is significantly higher for union members than non-members in the 
permanent category. The same character is observed for contract workers. Since the 
union density is higher among the permanent workers, they can reap the benefits of 
higher job tenure. Job tenure of contract workers is less important because contract 
workers cater to the seasonal demand for workers. Due to shorter stint in a particular 
firm contractual worker failed to get advantage of periodic pay hike, while 
permanent workers, due to their higher work experience get higher income than their 
counterpart. General skill does not pay any significant premium for both types of 
workers. This is because workers acquired skill through learning by doing or prior 
experience of working in other firms. However, the return to general skill is higher 
for permanent non-union member and contract union member. For both permanent 
and contract workers the return to general skill is higher among non-unionized 
segment. Special skill pays significant premium for unionized workers in permanent 
category. It should be noted that advanced skills are not provided in the conventional 
education system. Workers have to get additional technical skill from different 
training institutes before entering the job or employers provide the necessary 
training according to the requirement at their current workplace. For permanent non- 
unionized workers migration is associated significantly lower pay, while other 
coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant. Workers belongs to Special 
Economic Zones receive lower wages compared to other areas. Let us now turn to 
the analysis of the decomposition of the wage difference between union and non-
unionized workers.  
 
                                                 
7 The estimated t-statistics are presented in Table 4.   8
5. The Decomposition of Union/Non Union Wage Difference 
As indicated in Table 5, among the permanent workers, pay difference between 
union member and non-member is 0.443, representing an adjusted pay difference of 
55.7 per cent
8. Measured with union members’ coefficients, 31.1 per cent of this 
difference is due to the wage-determining characteristics of the permanent workers. 
When evaluated with non-members’ coefficients, the difference in observed 
characteristics explains 45.7 per cent of the pay difference. The unionized workers 
are supposed to be more motivated and prepared to invest in productivity 
augmenting factors
9. Thus, union wage premium, that is the higher return earned by 
the union sector for the same characteristics is in the range of 68.8 per cent and 54.2 
per cent. To further explore the issue for contract worker, the estimated wage 
difference is 0.098, or 10.3 per cent of the wage gap, which is narrower than 
permanent workers. The result suggests that the difference in the endowment of 
wage determining characteristics explain a minuscule portion of the wage gap, while 
union wage effect explains almost entire portion of the wage gap (99.4 and 99.8 per 
cent) for both segments. In brief, the presence of unions in organised manufacturing 
sector has significant wage effect for both permanent and contractual workers. Thus, 
workers do not get the perceptible opportunity of free riding the benefits of 
collective bargaining by unions.  
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
If the union membership is voluntary, unions set wages which is applied to all 
workers regardless of their member status. Under the circumstances workers would 
like to prefer free riding instead of joining union. The present study has made an 
attempt to estimate the pay difference between union members and non-members 
and the phenomenon of free riding in the organised manufacturing industries in 
India. The data were collected from some selected industrial areas across India. The 
empirical analysis of the paper reveals that trade unions reserve higher wages for 
their members. The wage difference between union worker and non union workers is 
55.7 per cent and 10.3 per cent for permanent and contractual workers respectively. 
A standard earning decomposition model is applied to investigate the factors 
responsible for the difference in wages. By controlling various productivity 
augmenting characteristics of the workers, the wage gap between union and non 
union workers is narrowed only 31.1 - 45.7 per cent for permanent workers. 
However, controlling for productivity related factors of the workers has hardly made 
any impact on the wage difference. A higher proportion of the wage gap, 54.2 - 68.8 
per cent for permanent workers and 99.4 - 99.8 per cent for contractual workers 
remain unexplained what is referred to as union premium. The wage gap between 
union and non-union workers explains almost entirely by union effect for contract 
workers. This result lends support of the view that workers have not been benefited 
from collective bargaining in the form of free riding in the organised manufacturing 
sector. High unionization can lower inequality of earnings and raise the overall 
industry wage rates. The high union effect among the contractual workers highlights 
the viability of labour union in this segment. Contractual workers are deprived of 
getting wage and non-wage benefits compared to their counterpart. Our labour laws 
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where D is the difference in log points in earning between union and non union workers.  
9 For detailed discussion see Budd and Na (2000).   9
do not allow the regular trade unions to raise industrial disputes on behalf of 
contractual workers. The contract workers have to form their own unions as they are 
not allowed to join the trade unions formed by permanent workers. However, the 
field survey has managed to collect few productivity augmenting characteristics of 
the workers, leading to an omitted variable problem. Nonetheless, the results are 
encouraging to consider the future study in other industries, especially in service 





Casual   Worker’s type; takes the value of 1 if the worker is casual  
Income   Hourly earning of each worker (Rs.)  
Basic  Takes the value of 1 if the worker have basic education  
Secondary  Takes the value of 1 if the degree is secondary education 
Higher  Takes the value of 1 if the worker has passed higher secondary 
Graduate   Takes the value of 1 if the degree is graduate and above  
Experience   Years involved in the present job  
Skill   Takes the value of 1 if the worker have general skill of working  
Advanced Skill  Takes the value of 1 if the worker have got special training  
Migration   Takes the value of 1 if the worker is a migrant  
SEZ   Takes the value of 1 for Special Economic Zone (SEZ) included in 
our study  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample (Means value) 
Union Workers  Non-union Workers  Characteristics 
Permanent Contractual Permanent Contractual 
Gross hourly wage (Rs)  20.8 10.5 16.6  9.9 
Education (%)      
Literate  8.8 12.6 8.2 13.0 
Basic Education  41.6 43.2 35.1 37.9 
Secondary  25.5 22.5 24.6 22.5 
Higher Secondary  16.1 17.1 21.6 19.5 
Graduate and above  8.0  4.5 10.4 7.1 
Experience (Years)  17.0  3.6 8.0 3.9 
Migration (%)      
Migrant  24.8 65.8 70.1 33.1 
Non migrant  75.2 34.2 29.9 66.9 
Skill (%)      
Skilled   83.2 73.9 82.8 78.7 
Unskilled  16.8 26.1 17.2 21.3 
Advanced Training      
Yes  8.1  22.6 17.9 15.4 
No  91.9 77.4 82.1 84.6 
Industrial location      
SEZ  17.1 3.6 14.9 9.5 
Other Places  82.9 96.4 85.1 90.5 
Region (%)      
West Bengal  90.5 35.1 19.4 72.8 
Other Places  9.5  64.9 80.6 27.2 
Number of Observation  137 111 134 169 
 Table 3 
Decomposition of the Wage Equations: Comparison by Union Membership 
Permanent Worker  Contractual Worker 
Union member  Non Member  Union member  Non member  Independent Variable 
Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
[Primary]       
Basic Education  0.011  0.016 0.173**  0.061 
Secondary  0.166  0.025 0.166**  0.146 
Higher Secondary  0.306**  0.133 0.095 0.323* 
Graduate  0.313**  0.275** 0.102  0.224 
Tenure  0.017*  0.007** 0.013*  0.010 
[Unskilled]       
Skill  0.063**  0.159** 0.127** 0.007 
[No special training]       
Special Training  0.277*  0.338* 0.112  0.169** 
[Non migrant]       
Migrant  0.070*  -0.242* 0.104  0.117** 
[Other areas]       
SEZ  -0.222*  -0.229* -0.254* -0.147 
Industry Category  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Region  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Constant  2.612*  2.591* 2.014* 1.992* 
Adjusted R Squared  0.306 0.300 0.164 0.150 
F Statistics   7.651* 7.242* 3.401* 4.225* 
Note: Omitted reference category are shown in brackets  
Coefficients of industry category and area are not reported to preserve space. 




Permanent Worker  Contractual Worker 
Independent Variable 
Union member  Non Member  Union member  Non member 
Basic Education  0.137  0.137 1.711 -0.592 
Secondary  0.201  0.201 1.519 1.297 
Higher Secondary  1.268  1.568 0.802 2.784 
Graduate  1.885  1.885 -0.588 1.470 
Tenure  1.603  1.603 1.771 1.369 
Skill  1.953  1.953 1.715 0.085 
Special Training  4.102  4.102 0.969 1.831 
Migrant  -3.618  -3.618 1.386 1.721 
SEZ  -2.678  -2.678 -2.747 -1.332 
Constant  17.510 17.546 14.483 14.795 
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Table 5 
Decomposition of union/non union wage gap 
Portion Attributed to Difference in  Worker’s 
Type  Decomposition Total  Gap 
Characteristics  Union 
Premium 








(68.86)  Permanent 

















(99.40)  Contract 
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